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The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and review
the basic model structure of a tactical air-ground combat
model, the "Tactical Air War Analysis Game" (TAWAG) . Existing
theater level air/ground combat models (both descriptive and
prescriptive) are reviewed and compared with TAWAG on the
basis of a number of criteria. Whenever possible an effort
is made to draw connections to existing models or point out
the differences. The goal of this effort is to present a
clear conceptual picture of the TAWAG model and to compare its
"heuristic programming" optimization methodology with those
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I . 1 GENERAL
N r
At
number of cycles per conflict of duration
T = NTAt
duration of one conflict cycle [time units]








initial inventories of air systems of type
i of sides X and Y
number of runways (bases) for aircraft
system i of side X(Y) /number of i-type
TCM-units deployed by sides X(Y)
1
number of air missions that the i-type air
system of side X(Y) can perform
,X(Y) ,y
Si basic single sortie survival probability ofi-type air system of side X(Y) on mission y
PX(Y) ,GF
*Sik probability that an i-type ground attack
sortie of side X(Y1 survives an attack by
a k-type fighter of the opponent
PX(Y) ,FE
Sik probability that an i-type (defense) fighter
of side X(Y) survives a duel with a k-type
escort fighter of the opponent
,X(Y),EF
Sik = probability that an i-type escort fighter of
side X(Y) survives a duel with a k-type




P ., = conditional probability that an air system
i of side X(Y) is killed on the ground by
a k-type ABA-sortie of the opponent
X (Y)
P . = probability that an i-type system of side





' 1} = SAS
~Pay-°ff function = probability of the
enemy's SAM system performance against the
i-type air system of X(Y) not being reduced
due to SAS by s£( Y )'l sorties of type k
X(Y) Y(X)
g. ( Hki ) = Probability that an i-type air system of
side X(Y) can take off for mission y after
an attack on its base by h£( x ) k-type
sorties of the opponent 1
X (Y ) Y ( X
)
h. (H^i ) = ABA-suppression function = probability that
ground support organization is at its full
capability after an attack on its base by
H{£. ' k-type sorties of the opponent
X (Y)
L. = i-type (non-recoverable) air system launch
1
rate of side X(Y)
X ( Y) u
G. = sortie generation rate for (recoverable) air




= SAM-system regeneration rate of side X(Y)




Q. = i-type ground support organization regenera-
tion rate
1.3 LAND-WAR MODEL





D. = coordinate of the left boundary of the s-th
segment of the j-th sector (j = 1,...,J and
s = l,...,Ng)
Q. = terrain-trafficability type of the s-th segment
^' of the j-th sector (= 1 for "normal" terrain,
= 2 for fortified zones, and = 3 for minefields)
x, ,y, = initial (TO&E) numbers of the k-th X and Y
weapon-system types (k = l,...,n^, ,
)








n. = initial number of X(Y) combat units (divisions)
in the j-th sector; Y is assumed to try to
maintain this number of divisions effective in
the sector
REX
n . = total number of time that X replacements are
-1 scheduled to enter X's rear region of the j-th
sector (n^x = means that no X replacements,
i.e., divisions, are scheduled)
RXn
. . = number of X divisions that enter as replacements
in the j-th sector forthe k-th time (j = 1,...,J
and k = l r ...,n?EX ) (n^EX = means that no X
replacements are scheduled)
RY
n- = number of (second echelon) reserve units (divi-
J sions) that are initially contained in the Y
rear region of the j-th sector
set of indices of the X divisions (combat units)
that are initially contained in the combat region
of the j-th sector; there are nQx elements in
this set
i k
IvA* = indices of the X reserve units that enter the
staging area of the X rear region of j-th sector
at the k-th time that replacements are so




XE time at which X replacements are scheduled to
enter the j-th sector for the k-th time; the







breakpoint for an attacking X(Y) unit (fraction
of initial combat capability at which an
attacking X(Y) unit "breaks off" its attack





breakpoint for a defending X(Y) unit (fraction
of initial combat capability at which a
defending X(Y) unit "breaks off" its defense
and starts to withdraw)
call point for Y replacements (fraction of
initial combat capability at which a call is
made for a new unit to replace an attacking
Y unit)
RU replacement point for an attacking Y unit(fraction of initial combat capability at
which a Y unit is replaced if a replacement is
available at the front)
4' j ' v mission (function) of the 1-th X division com-
mander in the combat region of the j-th battle-
field sector at time t
M^'
V
mission (function) of the j-th Y sector com-
mander at time t
3»v
= e. (M^/ Mr.' ) = engagement type as determined
by Table VIII
f
X(Y) (r /e) fractional casualty rate for an X(Y) unit in
an engagement of type e as a function of the
attacker/defender force ratio rG (see Fig. 13




•rrrtT , (A/D) «] = overall attacker/defender exchange ratio as
a function of (1) the duration of the engage-
ment T-, and (2) the initial (at the beginning
of the engagement) attacker/defender force
ratio (A/D) ~ (special attrition-process option)
F(P;t) = opposed-movement-rate function, which depends
on the attacker/defender force ratio
(incorporating the disruptive effects of
CAS) p; here the tactical situation vector
x is a parameter given by t = (e,Q), i.e.,
the tactical situation is described by the
engagement type and the local terrain
trafficability (see Fig. 15 for typical
such curves)
K , . = combat-capability value for FEBA movement of
the disruptive, noncasualty producing effects
of one CAS sortie by an X(Y) air system of







= unopposed and noninterdicted movement rate
of X(Y) reserve units in transit from the
staging area of the X(Y) rear region to
the front line
X (Y)
w. = weighting factor for sortie by the i-th
X(Y) air system in determining the degrada-
tion of the unopposed movement rate of Y(X)
reserve units due to enemy air interdiction
Y (X) 4
gxfy , (S ) = function that determines the fractional
reduction of the unopposed and noninter-
dicted movement rate of X(Y) reserve units
due to interdiction sorties in the time
interval [t , t L , )
v v+1
X (Y)
a. = combat-capability value of Y(X) ground-force
targets destroyed by one successful X(Y) CAS
sortie of type i
X (Y)
3- = combat-capability value of Y(X) ground-force
targets destroyed by one successful X(Y) INT
sortie of type i
14

time required for an X(Y) unit to assemble
in staging area after it is ordered to move
to the front line from the rear region
distance that an XCY) unit must travel
from the staging area of the rear region
to the front line
)DITIONAL SYMBOLS
= Air (ground) resources (air war systems)
available to side x and y
. . ,N = sequence of rounds to be played
air war strategy of x and y
fraction of the number XjJ v and Yj_ v of
air system of type i in the inventories of
X and Y being allocated to mission \i at
time t
= fraction of air war system of type i of X
and Y allocated to mission y
number of systems of type i allocated to
mission v surviving in interval [t ft .,]
= type of mission
= expected FEBA - movement of sector j for
the remainder of the conflict (v = k,,...,N )
= incremental FEBA movement in time-interval v
15

probability that air system i survives on
the ground on t < t < t
,
,
= probability that air system i allocated to
mission u can take off in [t ,t ,,]
v v+1
probability that air system i allocated to
mission y detects target
= probability that a mission is effective in
time interval [t ,t ,,]
v v+1
probability that air system i assigned to
mission y survives in time interval [t ,t ,,]
v v+1
= ground survivability of an attacked system
= number of effective sorties available at
time t from air system i for mission y
= number of i-type units deployed
number of fighters escorting ground attack
aircraft
number of enemy fighters defending against
ground attack raids
= number of ground attack air systems
ratio of the number of fighters escorting
the ground attack aircraft and the number





¥ = ratio of the number of AD fighters not




6 = fraction of air defense fighters which attack
enemy attack aircraft
Y (X)
D . = average number of air systems of type K
' attacking i-type air systems on the ground
in [t ,t Ll ]
v v+1
Y (X)
r. * (S «... ) = reduction factor of the sortie productioni,v* K, v
Ki
capability of the ground support organization
at time t * > t
Y (X)
Hv - = number of K-type enemy sorties attacking per




Since its introduction in World War I air power has always
played an important role in the outcome of ground combat.
Since WW II the improvements that aircraft have undergone will
make modern warfare more dynamic than ever before, and the
allocation of air power will play an ever increasing role in
influencing ground combat outcomes. Thus, it is important for
the military analyst to help in determining the "best" use
of tactical air power.
Starting from the basic premise that tactical air's
primary role is in Cdirect and indirect) support of the ground
battle, several models have been developed to allocate weapon
systems (of hypothetical general purpose air force alternatives)
to the basic tactical air missions in such a way as to optimize
a ground war objective or MOE-, i.e., FEBA movement. Most ear-
lier attempts to optimize the time-sequential allocation of
aircraft to missions have used a system evaluation criteria
such as number of tons of ordnance delivered on FEBA by air-
carft [Refs. 3,4 and 11]. Such a criteria, however, is a
surrogate MOE and does not really quantify the outcome of the
ground war.
It is well known that tactical allocations have a signifi-
cant influence on campaign outcomes and often have proved his-
torically to be frequently much more important than character-
istics of equipment or the size of the forces. In military
history we find quite a few occasions when inferior forces
18

defeated superior ones due to wise employment of the former
and unwise employment of the latter. This, combined with the
role air power plays in a battle, makes it absolutely necessary
for the operations research analyst to have a means of helping
to determine the "best" use of tactical airpower. However, in
modelling air war strategies and trying to optimize them, one
should not forget that it is the outcome of the ground-war
which determines the battle outcome.
In the past, many investigations of optimal air-war strate-
gies (i.e., assignments of tactical aircraft to missions) have
not explicitly considered the evolution of the ground battle
in their evaluations of air war strateegies [Ref . 11] . TAWAG
seeks to determine an "optimal" air allocation strategy within
the context of ground-war objectives and to reflect its influ-
ence on the outcome of the land battle. Thus it will provide
quantitative information to decision makers concerning long-
range planning for operational design of future aircraft and
eventually being able to investigate trade-offs between air
and ground systems.
In Section II. B a comparison of existing models, their cri-
teria and their weaknesses is given. It will provide the reader
with an overview of existing efforts in modelling air/ground
campaigns and lead the way to understanding this model. Without
detailed and thorough understanding of what goes on inside a
model, the analyst is likely be left with nothing more than
a "black box." Therefore this thesis describes and evaluates
19

TAWAG. Further investigations could try to test the model's
behavior by doing some sample calculations . Wherever possible
an effort will be made to draw connections to existing models
or point out the differences.
The first part of this effort consists of a literature
survey in order to give the reader some background on attrition
modeling and on existing models in the USA. In the second part
follows the model description with its two basic submodels -
the air-war model and the ground-war model - and a description
of the optimization methodology.
In the last part, final comments are given on the model





II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE SURVEY
In this chapter a brief review is first given on combat
modelling. This effort outlines the two approaches used in
the United States for modelling combat attrition in large-
scale combat operations
:
- detailed Lanchester-type models of attrition in
tactical engagements
- aggregated-force casualty-assessment models of attrition
in tactical engagements (called firepower-score approach)
TAWAG uses the first approach for modelling the attrition of
tactical aircraft in the air war and the latter approach to
represent attrition in the ground war. The second part gives
a short summary of existing air/ground combat models of both
optimizing and nonoptimizing types. Special consideration is
given to the optimization methodology and how the models encom-
pass the different air combat missions. The third part sum-
marizes the limitations of the existing models.
A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON COMBAT MODELLING
For general-purpose forces and conventional war, combat
models may be considered to fall into two categories:
(1) those that treat specific combat actions, e.g., a
small unit infantry firefight, tank engagement or
air-to-air duel in detail;
(2) those that analyze large confrontations of force
aggregations in a campaign.
21

Detailed models that simulate two-sided engagements represent
the highest degree of realism. But since the combat inter-
actions as well as the influences of the terrain (line-of-sight)
,
etc., are microscopically analyzed and studied, the sheer
immensity of the volume of the details for the assessment of
combat outcomes is so overwhelming that not even large scale
computers are today able to handle large scale operations by
detailed Monte Carlo techniques. This technique is limited to
the first category (ASARS II- platoon, DYNTACS , CARMONETTE -
company, battalion). Analytical models (e.g., differential
equations) are also used for small unit campaigns.
For large-scale campaigns two approaches are used; analyti-
cal models (DIVOPS, VECTOR II) and firepower-score models
(ATLAS, GACAM, TCM) . Both types are much more abstract than
Monte Carlo simulations. The approaches mainly used in the
United States for modelling combat attrition (see also Taylor
[Ref . 20] ) are
- detailed Lanchester-type models of attrition in tactical
engagements
,
- aggregated-force casualty-assessment models based on
the use of index numbers to quantify military capabilities.
The first approach dates back to 1914 when F.W. Lanchester hypo-
thesized that combat between two opposing homogeneous forces
F.W. Lanchester: Aircraft in Warfare; The Dawn of the
Fourth Arm - No. V, The Principle of Concentration, Engineering
98 (1914). Reprinted on pp. 2138-2148 in: The World of Mathe-
matics (Newman, Ed.), Simon and Schuster, New York 1956).
22

could be modelled by
dX
=
-aY with X(0) = X
,dt o
dY
3t = -bX with YCO) = Y ,dt o
where X(t) and Y(t) denote the numbers of X and Y combatants,
and a and b are constants that are today called Lanchester
attrition-rate coefficients. These attrition-rate coefficients
represent the fire effectiveness of individuals in each of the
two homogeneous forces. More recent extensions of Lanchester*
s
original work and enrichments can be found in References 17 and
2
20. Also not free of shortcomings , Taylor has pointed out that
"Lanchester 's simple differential equation
models are quite reasonable. They yield results
that are in consonance with military judgement."
TAWAG uses this approach in the air-war submodel for modelling
the attrition of tactical aircraft.
The second approach, often called the firepower-score
approach is basically a technique for aggregating heterogeneous
forces into a single homogeneous force on each side. It develops
one number (referred to as the firepower index) to represent
the "combat potential" of a unit. In large-scale ground-combat
models, firepower indices are used as a surrogate for unit
strength. They are then in general used to
2J.G. Taylor: Lanchester-Type Models of Warfare, Chapter
2, p. 110, July 1977 (to be published).
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(1) dtermine engagement outcomes,
(2) assess casualties,
(3) determine FEBA movement.
Although much criticized [Ref. 19] Stockfish [19, p. 128] also
claims that no satisfactory simple technique for aggregating
modern conventional forces currently exists. Therefore, since
conventional forces must be aggregated in many analyses, and
until a better alternative is developed, firepower scores will
continue to be used. TAWAG uses this approach to represent
attrition in the ground war.
B. REVIEW OF AIR/GROUND COMBAT MODELS
The review considers tactical air campaign models for
determining a "good" allocation of a/c to missions. These
range from player participation to game theoretic optimization
approaches. The optimization models while they do determine
the optimal strategies for aircraft allocations , require simpli-
fications and abstractions in model development for reasons of
mathematical tractability in the determination of optimal stra-
tegies. The fixed strategy models on the other hand are higher
resolution simulations but are too complex to allow for optimi-
zation.
Earlier attempts on modelling air/ground combat are those
by A. Mengel [Ref. 16] , Fulkerson and Johnson [Ref. 10J and
Berkowitz and Dresher [Refs. 3 and 4] . The conclusions con-
cerning aircraft allocation range from splitting between ABA
(period 1 to N in a finite n period game) and CAS (period N+l
24

until n) [Ref. 10] or, depending on pure or mixed strategies,
splitting between AD and ABA in the case p/q < 2.7 and splitting
between CAS, AD and ABA using the pure strategy or allocating
the entire force to AD, ABA or CAS randomly [Ref. 4] in the
mixed case when p/q > 2.7 where
p = Blue air strength
q = Red air strength.
Other models included in this review for comparison are the
LULEJIAN model, DYGAM, OPTSA and TAC CONTENDER as optimizing
models, and VECTOR, TAGS, TALLY, MINICOM, ATLAS and IDAGAM
as non-optimizing approaches.
An important problem associated with a tactical air campaign
is that of allocating the tactical air force among the various
air tasks in a competitive environment.
Table I shows the missions treated by each of the above
mentioned models as well as by TAWAG and MAMOTAC. Although
TAWAG encompasses the largest set of missions of all models and
thus allows more flexibility and perhaps a higher level of
real world detail, this might as well result in higher com-
plexity and increased computation time.
Of the optimizing models, DYGAM and OPTSA consider only
three basic missions. Except for TAC CONTENDER, TAWAG is the
only model that differentiates between the defensive counter
air mission of airbase defense CABD) and battlefield defense
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non-optimizing models, none accounts for fighter escort and
defense suppression missions beside TAWAG
.
The distinction between ABD and BFD seems to be more real
because it is most likely that BFD will be preassigned to CAP
stations near the front lines and ABD similarly deployed in
rear ares (see also Ref. 11, p. 7).
1. Model Descriptions and Comparison
a. LULEJIAN Model [Ref. 26]
The model, which discribes activities involving
Army units and Air Force tactical aircraft in mid-intensity
warfare of the theater level, was developed for use in making
net assessments, and in generating information for use in
tradeoffs among weapon systems. Rather than using firepower-
score-approach to determine attrition and FEBA movement, the
model is based upon a concept of trading space fo survivability.
As a result of each side contacting and locating one another's
forces for direct and support fire, which includes that provided
by air, losses are sustained by both sides. The daily movement
of the FEBA is associated with the actual attrition of opposing
forces relative to their acceptable levels.
The Lulejian Model consists of a set of aggregate
submodels combined in a framework designed to allow determination
of enforceable outcomes. The five basic submodels are: a
Logistics and Interdiction Model, a Tactical Air Model, a
Resource Allocation Algorithm, a Ground Force Management Model
and a Ground Combat Assessment Model.
27

An aircraft strategy is specified in the model
by assigning a cardinal number to each of five missions con-
sidered and thus indicating its priority. The user is required
to provide a matrix specifying the order of preference of
available a/c types for each mission. The model translates
then, for a given force of a/c, the 18 possible strategies
into a decision vector. The set of decision vectors is, how-
ever, quite sparse compared to that which would result if the
TAC CONTENDER, DYGAM or OPTSA (sections B.l d, b and c respec-
tively) approaches were applied to the case of multiple a/c
types
.
The Lulejian Model employs a resource allocation
algorithm that attempts to determine the approximate game value
and approximately optimal strategies for both players at each
stage of the game. The basic approach is to decompose the
problem into the solution of many one-move games. It is very
similar to the "successive sweep" method employed by TAC CONTENDER
(see B.Ld, also [Ref. 27]).
b. DYGAM
The DYnamic GAMes solver was developed at Control
Analysis Corporation [Ref. 25J to solve general multi-stage
games. The general solution technique used is based upon dynamic
programming. The main computational limitation of dynamic pro-
gramming is the dimension of the state space. In order to
solve a multi-stage game with dynamic programming, it is necessary
to determine (or estimate) the optimal payoff for each state
and stage of the game. The approach taken is to approximate
28

these payoff functions with polynomials. Thus it is only
necessary to estimate the polynomial coefficients for each
period, rather than the actual payoff function. However, this
approximation approach may give inaccurate answers due to errors
in the approximation. Hence, the polynomials are not used
directly to provide the payoff estimate for each initial state,
rather, they are used as guideposts for a forward evaluation.
The refined estimate of the game value is obtained by a Monte
Carlo approach which traces out a number of possible paths
through the various stages of the game, each of which results
in a different total payoff. These results are averaged to
yield the forward value, and are also used to estimate the
standard deviation of possible outcomes.
DYGAM (like OPTSA) addresses the behavioral game.
Although it obtains only approximate answers, computational
experience shows that they were very close to the optimal answers
produced by OPTSA. In addition DYGAM is not limited to 3
stages as OPTSA. It has been used to analyze 90-stage games.
The ability to estimate the standard deviation of
possible outcomes is a useful feature. Thus, the game value in
a behavioral game is the expected total payoff resulting when
both players use their optimal probabilistic strategies.
A behavioral game is an extended game (one which uses
expected payoff) which considers only behavioral strategies,
where a behavioral strategy is an adaptive one that tells a
player what actions to take based on the current system state.
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c. OPTSA [Ref. 6]
The OPTimal Sortie Allocation models have been
developed at the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) for
computing percentage assignments of general-purpose aircraft
to missions by period, where assessments of occurrences during
the war are performed for a specified number of sub-periods within
each period. The overall model is a zero-sum, two person,
sequential game. It only addresses three missions (see Table
I). Aircraft are of four types: general-purpose, special-
purpose CAS, special purpose ABA and special-purpose INT. The
model optimally assigns only MRCA. The assignments of the
special-purpose aircrafts are fixed.
Aircraft assignments are performed within the con-
text of a ground/air war. Three types of ground units on each
side, differentiated only by firepower per unit are considered.
Total firepower, consisting of firepower contributed by ground
units plus firepower contributed by CAS, is used in forming
force ratios for calculating casualties to ground forces and
FEBA movement. The model exists in two different versions,
OPTSA I and OPTSA II.
The OPTSA I model includes nine non-adaptive games,
a game type in which the time-phased aircraft assignments of
each side do not depend upon the previous history of the
time-phased assignments of the opposite side.
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There are three measures of effectiveness, each
for three specified times during a fixed-duration war:
(1) FEBA position,
(2) Cumulative Blue-minus -Red ground-plus-air
firepower,
(3) Cumulative Blue-minus-Red air firepower.
According to the authors, the set of all possible time-phased
assignments considered in the model is called the set of
strategies. If the solution on both sides is pure (does not
involve randomizing over the set of strategies or, equivalently
,
places probability of unity on one of the deterministic strate-
gies) , then the related adaptive game, where knowledge of moves
made by both sides is used as the game progresses, has the same
solution and value. The OPTSA II model involves a behavioral
game. The measure of effectiveness of the behavioral game
may be any of the nine measures of OPTSA I. The behavioral
game involves randomization over the actions at each stage,
where the probability distribution over which the randomization
is made depends upon the actions selected at previous stages.
In Reference 6, p. 982, the developers state "The
OPTSA models solve an aggregated problem exactly. " Their quest
for optimality was motivated by their considerable doubt that
the solutions to games obtained by other procedures are opti-
mal for the games being played. Thus OPTSA is the only model
that employs a mathematically rigorous optimization technique
which guarantees finding an optimal solution to a staged game
on the mutual allocation of tactical air resources.
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OPTSA's limitation to three stages, however, must
be seen to be serious when compared to other models,
d. TAC CONTENDER
TAC CONTENDER was developed by the Office of the
Assistant Chief of Staff, Studies and Analysis, U.S. Air Force
(AF/SA) [Ref . 27] . It is an "air only " computer model which
simulates the interactions between two opposing tactical air
forces in a campaign of extended duration. The interactions
between ground forces are not modeled, but the impact of "air"
on the ground mission is accounted for by recording the cumula-
tive amount of ordnance delivered in CAS.
The war is modelled as a multi-stage, two-person,
zero-sum game. The model attempts to optimize the strategies
used by both sides and thus measure the capabilities of the
fighting forces by estimating what outcome of the war could
be, if both sides fought optimally. The payoff function is:
n
M = I (Blue Tons on day i) - (Red Tons on day i)
i=l
+ (Total Blue Potential Value on day n+1)
- (Total Red Potential Value on day n+1)
TAC CONTENDER attempts to determine a pair of allocation
strategies which guarantee each side certain "minimal out-
comes". If a side were to choose any other allocation it
could do no better and would probably do worse.
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Although the current version of TAC CONTENDER
can address several types of aircraft (up to 10) , it basically
considers only one type of aircraft for each side in its
optimization machinery (by converting the different aircraft
types to "equivalent" ones)
.
Of the two general approaches to solve sequential
and differential games - dynamic programming and the variational
approach - the model uses the latter by identifying a set of
necessary conditions that solutions in pure strategies must
satisfy if they are to be solutions of the game G = (U,V,K)
(U and V being the strategy sets available to Blue and Red
respectively and K the payoff function for Blue) , and then
employing a discrete analogue of a technique known as the
"successive sweep method" normally used for optimal control
problems with differential equations defining the state of
variables.
2 . Non-Optimizing Models
a. VECTOR-0 [Ref. 29,30]
The model, which describes activities involving
Army units and Air Force tactical aircraft in mid-intensity
warfare at the theater level, was developed for use in esti-
mating net assessments performing force deployment studies, and
in generating information for use in tradeoffs among weapon
systems. Rather than using the firepower score/force ratio
concept to determine attrition and FEBA movement, VECTOR-0
uses Lanchester-type equations that are based on physically
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oriented submodels of those combat processes whose parameters
are more readily measurable.
The first steps of air-war calculations include
bookkeeping functions such as determining the number of sorties
flown on each mission per day and grouping aircraft for flying
their missions. Then attack aircraft (possibly with escorts)
are followed on various attack missions through a sequence of
events such as air-to-air combat, target area ground-to-air
attrition, delivery of ordnance on a/c targets. Following these
computations, results are cumulated over all groups and missions
to give expected number of destroyed a/c and expected damage
to ground targets. Before any air-war effects are computed
for a given battle day, tactical rules - as inputs by the user -
are employed to assign available a/c to missions.
The model of Air-to-Air Combat assumes that an
escorted attack group on mission m is detected by its opponent's
warning and control system and that interceptors can be vectored
to the penetrators with a user input probability. Then a given
sequence of events is followed which concern the interactions
of interceptors, escorts and attack aircraft.
For the Ground-to-Air Attrition Red and Blue are
assumed each to possess two kinds of ground-based air defense
weapon sites - longe range and short range - uniformly deployed
within each sector for a given side. Following air-to-air
combat, an aircraft group is assumed to pass through a portion
of these randomly located defenses en route to their target, to
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encounter any air defenses defending the target, and finally
to pass through a portion again while returning to friendly
territory.
As for TALLY and MINICOM, the approach for attri-
tion calculations used for VECTOR puts a large burden on the
user because almost all activities are controlled by user-
specified tactical decisions. If detailed submodels and analyses
are available to generate realistic values for all of the re-
quired quantities, the general approach may be reasonably
satisfactory. However, it is often the case that at least some
of the required quantities are functionally dependent on the
precise numbers and mixture of aircraft types used in a particu-
lar situation, and these functional dependencies are often
obscured, e.g., the air-to-air attrition rate in VECTOR not
being a function of the number of aircraft assigned to air
defense or the FEBA movement rates depending on the activity
being performed (advance, pursuit, etc.) for each of the man-
euver forces at the FEBA but not being a function of the air-
ground interactions.
b. TAGS [Ref. 9,11]
TAGS-V (Theater Air-Ground Study) is a highly aggre-
gated computer model that relies on simplified abstractions of
elements that are treated in greater detail in more comprehen-
sive models of theater warfare. The model simulates ground
and air activities on a day-to-day basis. The ground units
in TAGS-V are defined in terms of homogeneous division equiva-
lents, i.e. , no distinction is made between armoured or
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mechanized divisions and infantry divisions. The FEBA moves
as a unit and is viewed as the average movement of the entire
theater front.
The air forces consist of three aggregated aircraft
types - fighters, attack a/c, and bombers - that may be allo-
cated among six different missions: AD, ABA, INT, CAS, SAS
and ES. The CAS mission has two primary effects. First, it
produces casualties among ground combat personnel, and, second,
it influences the FEBA movement. Counter SAM (SAS) missions
are designed to destroy area-deployed SAMs in a rollback opera-
tion that clears corridors for subsequent deep penetrations by
aircraft on interdiction, counter airfield, and escort missions.
The ground forces defend against the offensive
air strikes by means of antiaircraft fire and SAMs. The ground
combat is quite simplified. Casualties resulting from conven-
tional ground combat are based on planning factors roughly derived
from statistical records of World War II and Korean ground actions,
and are related to the ratio of combat strengths of the forces
in combat. Additional casualties are inflicted by CAS sorties.
The TAGS-V input parameters fall into three cate-
gories :
(1) force size and effectiveness factors,
(2) aircraft allocation by mission,
(3) a set of historically-based empirical factors




Any of the model parameters can be changed as a function of
the value of any other during the course of the conflict. As
a special feature any model parameters can be specified as
having an uncertain value.
c. TALLY [Refs. 31,32]
TALLY is an air battle computer model developed at
the Rand Corporation specifically for use in a study of the
effects of various allocations of NATO tactical air resources
on a conventional land battle in the Central Region of Europe.
The basic functions of the TALLY program are
(1) the allocation of sorties to five missions:
ABA, "mobility interdiction" MI, CAS, RCN, AD;
(2) computation of expected aircraft losses both
on the ground as a result of ABA attacks and
in the air as a result of either air-to-air
or surface-to-air defenses;
(3) the computation of the expected number of
weapon-carrying CAS and/or MI sorties which
survive defenses and arrive over their targets.
This latter class of sorties can be used as input values to a
ground battle model such as the Rand Theater Operations Tacti-
cal Evaluation Model (TOTEM)
.
The current TALLY program assumes a four-cycle day,
beginning at midnight, where cycles 1 and 4 are night cycles
and 2 and 3 are day cycles. The user has to define and specify
many values, e.g., number of cycles per day (optional), airbases,
including the types of a/c at the base, beginning a/c inventory
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at each base, sortie generation rate disruption factor, air-
to-air attrition rates. The expected number of a/c located
on a base at the time a base is subject to an airbase attack
is computed within the program based upon the input sortie
rates of the aircraft on the base, their abort rate, sortie
length, the disruption factor specified, and the number of
daylight hours.
If TALLY is used in conjunction with TOTEM, the
function of TALLY is to provide sorties of specified aircraft
type, weapon type, and delivery mode in attacks against spe-
cific targets in the ground war simulation. The TOTEM model
is then used to determine the impact of the tactical air sor-
ties on the course of the ground war.






1. weakness of optimization methodology
2. limitation in the number of decision
vectors considered
3. user-specification of priorities
concerning missions might cause
conflicts with A/C characteristics
4. no distinction between ABD and BFD.
1. treats only one A/C type




4. no distinction between ABD and BFD









1. long computer running-time caused
by insistence on exact optimality
2. limited number of stages
3. no distinction between ABD and BFD
4. no escort or suppression missions
considered.
1. incorrect treatment of expected
values
2. weakness of optimization methodology
3
.
treatment of multiple A/C types
is questionable
4. neither escort nor suppression
missions considered
5. inconsistencies in attrition relation-
ships .






1. ABD and BFD not individually
treated.









2. shelters not destroyed.
1. ABD and BFD not individually treated
2. neither escort nor suppression mission
considered
3. weakness of attrition methodology
(e.g. , air-to-air attrition rate
not a function of number of AD A/C.
1. limited treatment of air-to-air
attrition
2. CAS not considered in detail
3. BFD and ABD not treated individually.




2. highly aggregated and low resolu-
tion.
IDAGAM 1. deterministic model
[Ref. 2]
2. no relation between rate of advance
and CAS effectiveness
3. suppression not considered
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III. OVERALL MODEL STRUCTURE OF THE TAWAG MODEL
Since ATLAS was developed in the U.S.A. about 15 years ago
and has subsequently become the most widely used theater level
model, efforts by model developers to add more realism and to
assess weapons systems in a wider context to assure their
marginal effectiveness and their compatability with operational
and strategic objectives lead to a "complexity crisis."
The use of such models, in particular large scale theater
level war games, proved that their immediate potential for the
assessment of long range objectives for armaments planning to
be rather limited. High level aggregated analytical or
deterministic (closed) simulation models seem to be better
suited for this purpose. They provide the capability to pro-
cess large numbers of force structures and environments. This
is due to the uncertainties associated with the forecast of
long range developments.
Furthermore the assessment of force structure and armaments
alternatives on the basis of mutually optimal employment con-
cepts, (see Berkovitz and Dresher [4] , Galiano and Miercot
[11] ) , which have proved to often have a greater impact on the
outcome of battles as equipment and force size, make it necessary
to develop models which reflect the interdependencies of size,
structure, equipment and employment of military forces.
The Tactial Air V7ar Analysis Game (TAWAG) by R. Huber and
J. Taylor accounts for these considerations. It is to be
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considered as an element of a "hierarchically structured
compound gaming approach, in which "Quick Games" are used as
cursory tools to check the principal viability of innovative
structures , technologies and operational concepts , and as
screening devices to reduce system variability and establish
dominant alternatives for subsequent feasibility analysis by
means of "Research Games."
A. THE MODEL
TAWAG is an anlytical "Quick Game Model" to aid decision
makers in the assessment of long-range air armaments policy
options within the context of high-intensity conventional war
in Central Europe.
It may be thought of as consisting of two related time
sequential combat models, each of which, in turn, feeds the
other. These sub-models are air combat and ground combat.
The basic model structure is shown in the following figure 1.
The main inputs to both models are related to the combat
resources R available to each side, e.g., air combat systems
(A)
,
ground combat units (G) , their initial deployment, and
their performance in the form of
:
• V.-T-0. /TJC(Y),u _X(Y),GF _X(Y),EF
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- air system launch rate (L. ),
- sortie generation rate (G. ),
X (Y)
- SAM-system regeneration rate (R<, )
,
- runway regeneration rate (TV )
,
X (Y)
- ground support organization regeneration rate (Q. ),
th k
- firepower score of k weapon system (s , . )
,
- breakpoints for attacking or defending units (f™ (Y) ,f™ ) ,
Y
- replacement point for an attacking unit (f DrT ) /
- casualty rate (f
x
,y . (r ,e) ) , and
- opposed-movement-rate function (F(p,i).
The modelling of the attrition of tactical aircraft in the air
war is based on Lanchester-type attrition models. For the
representation of attrition in the ground war the firepower-
score approach is used.
TAWAG considers the conflict as a sequence of v = 1, .../ N_
stages at the beginning of each of which the attacker and
X Ydefender decide upon their employment strategies a . and a . for
a round K such that the expected penetration d of the attacker's
land forces into the defender's territory during the remainder
of the conflict (v = k, f .../N ) is as small as possible from




For each given pair of opposing forces R-.(RX ,R^) and
A GR^R-^Ry.) , the model determines the air war strategy a* using
"heuristic programming" which reflects the mutually best
A A
employment policies for the air resources R
x
and Ry in terms
of their direct and/or indicrect support of the land battle
A A A A A
with the air resource mix alternatives R.. = R (x-,x
2 ,
. . . ,x. ,x a)
A X
and R the air resource mix preferred by X is obtained from
4a > 4h d* (RL> < d* <4h>




where ^ stands for preferred, meaning that air resource mix
A A
alternative R^. is preferred over R.., iff the resulting
penetration d* of the attacker's land forces is smaller using
^h*
B. THE OPTIMIZATION METHODOLOGY
1. The Optimization Problem
There exist several air-ground combat models which use
optimization techniques to find optional solutions [Ref . 11]
.
But the optimization models, or normative models, while
determining the optimal strategies for aircraft allocations,
require simplifications and abstractions in model development
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for reasons of mathematical tractability in the determination
of optimal strategies. The fixed strategy or descriptive
models on the other hand are higher resolution simulations
but are too complex to allow for optimization.
The state-of-the-art for determining optimal combat
strategies is still fairly primitive and can only consider
relative small problems (in the sense of only a few state
variables) . Most tactical air campaign models which attempt
to follow an "optimal" allocation policy which maximizes the
force's effectiveness use an approach based on game theory or
differential games. Such approaches generate time-dependent
strategies for both sides that attempt to achieve a saddle
point solution or mutually-enforceable outcome, in the sense
that neither side can achieve a better result by using a
different strategy against the other side's optimal strategy.
Depending upon the representation of time by either a continuous
or a discrete variable, the optimization problem is called a
differential game or a multi-stage game, respectively.
Solving multi-stage or N-staged games presents a
severe methodological challenge. In order to obtain solutions
within reasonable computer running times (or at all) , a number
of simplifying assumptions and approximations are usually
employed. Some analysts feel that the resulting lack of real-
world detail in the model greatly limits its usefulness. On the
other hand, models employing prespecif ied, heuristically-based,
or player-specified strategies can reflect more operational
detail, since they are not encumbered by optimization theory.
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Another problem with using optimization relates to
the dimension of the strategy set. For example, the alloca-
tion of a multi-role aircraft to the eight tactical missions
as specified in TAWAG, see Table VI, with a min allocation
fraction of 1/8 (to permit simultaneous operations) results
in 6435 decision vectors a at each point in time, and since
the dimension of the strategy set increases exponentially with
the number of decision points or rounds of the game, a 4—
round conflict would require more than 1.7x10 allocations
to be considered for the side operating the multi-purpose sys-
tem. Even if one would consider only two different aircraft
types, a penetrator for the offensive roles and an intercepter/
escort-fighter for the defensive missions, a four-round con-
flict would result in 230 decision vectors with the strategy
12
set comprising about 3 • 10 possible strategies. Therefore,
the existing ,two-sided air campaign models optimizing alloca-
tion strategies, as TAC CONTENDER, OPTSA, DYGAM, LULEJIAN,
MAMOTAC and ATACAM, are, except for ATACAM, either restricted
with respect to the number of missions they consider or the
number of rounds the air war may last or both.
Since the authors of TAWAG felt that the explicit con-
sideration of the eight essential tactical air missions,
including the distinction between close air support and (mobility
and firepower) interdiction, which is not considered by any
of the models mentioned before (DYGAM, OPTSA, TAC CONTENDER,
VECTOR) [see also Ref. 11], was mandatory for its purposes, they
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found that none of the solution methodologies of the other
optimization models could be employed in TAWAG.
2. Approximation Of the Optimal Air- War Strategy
The optimization methodology in TAWAG decomposes the
N-staged strategy selection game into N sequential zero-sum
games for each of which the decision vector a ( v = 1,...,N)
is determined under the assumption that subsequent to t no
air resources are committed by either side, i.e., the conflict
continues as a pure land war for t ,,..., N. This methodology
does account for deferred air/ground effects (e.g., of mobility
interdiction, regeneration of resources) . It also maximizes
the more immediate gains to be obtained in the land battle from
the employment of tactical air resources rather than the average
gains over longer periods.
At the beginning of a round v, i.e., interval [t ,t ,]
A Athere are x. and y. of air systems of type 1 in the mven-
tories of X and Y. Then < <}>. Y) ' u < 1 is defined as the
A Afraction of the numbers x. and y. being allocated to
mission u at time t .
v
Also TAWAG defines the air war strategy a as a rule
for determining the sequence of decisions o^ ,0^, . . . ,o ,...,a
concerning the allocation of air resources i = 1, . . . #n„ *•.* of

















X (Y)Each strategy or decision a will result in a certain number
X (Y)
S of effective sorties in mission y at time t under the
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X (Y)Another prerequisite is that
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> has to be an integer
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with M. the number of different missions that air system
i of side X(Y) may perform.
With the eight missions TAWAG considers and the differ-








1 CAS 1 1
2 Interceptor 4 1/4
3 Penetrator 3 1/3
4 SAS 1 1
5 Multi-Role 8 1/8
6 TCM 2 1/4
Table IV
,
given the effective offensive air support sorties
AS „X,INT „Y,CAS „Y,INT
f Si , S , s; at time t,, the ground war model
mines, for each combat sector j, the FEBA-movement dJ,Nr
e expected for the remainder of the conflict (v = k.,...,N )
r the assumption that there is no offensive air support




_V X,CAS QX,INT QY,CAS Y,INT.£
*k lbk ' bk ' bk ' bk ' 1' ' k-l }
V °k/j
e F, is the incremental FEBA-movement in time interval v
a,,...,ak_, the hitherto selected air war strategies of
opposing tactical air forces.
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FEBA-movement is defined in terms of the penetration




When the defender X considers the worst case to be expected as
to ground losses in anyone of the combat sectors j the model
k v ~k' k'
X Y





Since the attacker Y attempts to maximize the penetration dis-
tance into the defender's territory, while the defender X
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attempts to minimize that same distance, this principle
results in
*k ,k y,dM = min max d , v kW
T X Y WT
ak ak
The mutually "optimal" air war strategy a, at time t, is then
approximated from
ak " °k (dN >
assuming that both sides have complete information on their
mutual states and the available strategies.
The optimal air campaign strategies pursued by the











The principal air-to-air and air-to-ground interactions of
an air campaign are indicated in Figure 3 in pictorial form.
Over the many days of a war, the air forces on either side can
be used for the attack of the opponent's air bases or attack
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PICTORIAL DEPICTION OF BATTLEFIELD





of the opponent's ground forces. This is called the offensive
role which splits in
air superiority - OCA - role
and
close air support - OAS - role.
Or they may be deployed on defensive missions to
intercept the opponent's attack aircraft - DCA - role
Distinguishing between these roles, TAWAG considers the
following air missions:
- OFFENSIVE COUNTER AIR-ROLE (OCA)
1. SAM - suppression (SAS)
2. Air Base Attack (ABA)
- OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT-ROLE (OAS)
3. Close Air Support (CAS)
4. Interdiction (INT)
- DEFENSIVE COUNTER AIR-ROLE (DCA)
5. Air Base Defense (ABD)






'D missions provide the air cover for the land forces during
lildup phases in staging areas and during transit into the
>mbat region. They are directed at INT- and EIN-missions
.
Le interactions between the air systems as well as between the
















Air System i\ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
.
CAS 1 *
Interceptor 2 * * P X) p 1 '
Penetrator 3 * * *
SAS 4 *
Multi-Role 5 * * * * * * * *
TCM 6 * *
1) Interceptors provide escort to Penetrators only
Mission Capability of Air Systems
Table VI
ie allocation of air systems to certain missions depends on
>les the air system can fulfill. Generally only three special
irpose A/C (CAS, INT, ABA) and one general purpose A/C are
.ayed.
TAWAG considers six notational air systems of which five







is a multi-role system like the German MRCA. The special
purpose system also includes the forthcoming TCM (see Table
VI) .
1. The Air Combat Model
Before allocating air systems i to missions y and, as
a prerequisite to the approximation of optimal air war strate-
gies, the air combat model determines the instantaneous states
A A
of the opposing air forces x and v and calculates the number
X (Y)
of effective sorties S. ' available at time t from air
1, v
system i for mission y.
The main events that influence the outcome of an air





















The probabilities are defined as:
X ( Y) u
P_ . = probability that air system i survives on theU1
'
v ground in t < t < t
+1 ; (III.l.b(D)
P_. = probability that an air system i allocated to
' mission y can take off in [t ,t - ) ; (III.l.b(2))
X (Y ) y





v+1 ); (III. 1. a. (2))
X (Y ) u
P . /M = probability that air system i allocated to
mission y detects target (user specified)
and are determined by the model as outlined in the subsequent
sections
.
From Figure 5 it can be seen that the probability of
X (Y) u
an effective mission in the time interval [t ,t L ,) , P_. 'V v+1 ' Ei ,
v
is equal to the probability that event e, occurs and can be
calculated with the above defined probabilities as
p
X(Y),y m pX(Y),y pX(Y) / y X(Y),y pX(Y),yEi,v Gi,v Ti,v Si,v Di,v
The probabilities are calculated in subsequent sections.
Furthermore, the probability that an air system i assigned to
mission y survives in time interval [t ,t ,) is given as the
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l/V user input sortie generation rate for





"i,v fraction of the numbers x. and y. of
air systems of type i in the inventories





' U = <
# of Blue type i
a/c assigned to







1 , V 1 , V
i/V
= <
# of Red type i a/c
assigned to mission
y at time tv
A
Y, cjrl/V T i,v
y,v
which makes it possible to calculate
S f y =
'i,v
number of air systems of type i
allocated to mission \k surviving
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rate for system i
and mission y
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J
for GY ' y < 1i,v -
otherwise.
These equations are only valid for recoverable air systems.
For expendable system (TCM) they are different.
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# of air systems of
type i allocated to
mission y at time








X (Y) uThe number of effective sorties S. available at time t
i f v v
from air system i for mission y depends on the number of type
i a/c assigned to a mission y at time t , the probability that
a mission y is effective in time interval [t , t ,) and the







X,y GX,ui,v Ei,v i,v
= <
0<'v -> i& + X «&V X]




'^[(GY ' y - 2 ) P*^ + | (P*^ ) A ]J i,v i,v Ei,v
x—1 El ' v
for GX ' y < 1
otherwise
for gT' p < 1
otherwise
These equations determine the number of effective sorties in
each role, which result from the strategy set of the two
Y CAS
opponents. Especially interesting are the number S.' and
Y , INT
S. which are used in the Ground War Model to determine the
1 r V
air induced losses and eventually contribute to the FEBA-movement,
a. Mission Survivability
During its "airborne" phase of a mission an air
system can encounter several incidents that could influence its
survivability
.
Aircraft that are allocated to ABA and INT or to
escort missions EBA and EIN may suffer attrition due to area
deployed SAM defense en route to their targets. The surviving
aircraft can be engaged by enemy fighters (ABD, BFD) in the
target area or, if surviving this part of the mission, encounter
ground-based air defense systems in the target area.
The model accounts for these events by treating
















^ strategies' i.e., ABD versus




SAS and/or DCA actions
during mission
The last is the basic survival probability P
q
. which is
the single-sortie survival probability when no SAS- and/or DCA
actions precede or counter the respective sorties on mission
y. It reflects the effectiveness of unopposed ground-based
air defense systems.
(1) SAM-Suppression Strategies
SAM suppression, as an Offensive Counter-Air
method, can be played either as SAM-attack preceding ABA and/or
INT-mission or in terms of ECM accompanying ABA- and INT-
missions. The result of SAS is an increase in the basic single-
sortie survival probabilities for the subsequent ground attack
and escort sorties.
The SAS pay-off function f* (Y) (S? (Y) ' -1 ) is ar 2 1 , y k
monotonically decreasing function reflecting the relative
reduction of the SAM r s sortie attrition capability against i-
X (Y) 1type air systems on mission y as the number S, ' of k-type
sorties allocated to SAS (y = 1) increase
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^CY) (SX<Y>,1 3 =^ <
1.0 for S* (Y)/1 =k
for S* (Y) rl = 800k










) is interpreted as a probability for
le SAM's performance reduction. To account for different
sployment concepts (i.e. , area or belt-type) and SAS tactics
:her SAS-payoff functions may be specified by the user. The
.ngle sortie survival probability of the i-type system on
.ssion \i subsequent to or accompanied by SAS from
[(Y) ,1 v CX(Y) ,1 . . . . . . , .
=




which reflects the full suppression effects.
A suppressed and/or damaged SAM system may
eventually regenerate to its original performance. Therefore
X (Y)
the user can specify a SAM-system generation rate R_ which
is assumed to be constant for sides X and Y equal 1 for ECM.
This means that SAM-systems return to full effectiveness as
soon as ECM-SAS ceases. In the case of an attack of SAM posi-
X (Y) 1tions prior to ABA- and INT-missions R ' is assumed to be
0.5. If the SAM-system has not yet fully regenerated before
subsequent SAS missions take place, then the model accounts
for this by modifying the basic single sortie survivability.
Considering the damage done by SAS the model
evaluates the single sortie survival probability at time
X (Y) 1
t * > t , i.e.. after a SAS by S sorties at time t as
X(Y) , CXCY) ,1
Si CS v
pX(Y),U X(Y>,1 V(X) xm.li




1 )-P^.(Y) ^}for (t *-t ) < AtSi ,Y(X)
,t *) = <
,X(Y),y
Si otherwise
where k =l,...,(t*-t )/At is the number of time intervals
v
of length At elapsed since the last SAS effort.
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C2) Air-to-Air Combat Encountered by DCA
Another modification of the basic sortie
survival probability is due to the possibility that ABA-
and INT-missions
/
whether accompanied by fighter escort sorties
(EGA, EIN) or not might encounter enemy fighters (ABD, BFD)
in the target area after they sustained losses from not
suppressed SAM sites.
The number of surviving ABA, EBA or INT, EIN
air systems en route to their targets which can be engaged in
a dogfight by enemy defense fighters depend on the number of
effective sorties S . ' , for =2, 4, 7 and 8 and the effective-
ness of the enemy's SAM system as calculated in the previous
section.
The modelling of air-to-air combat assumes
that an escorted attack group of attackers (ABA, INT) on mission
y is detected by its opponent's warning and control system and
that interceptors (ABD, BFD-fighters) engage the attackers in
the following events:
Escorts are assigned to attack interceptors in one-on-
one engagements. Excess escorts are idle; excess inter-
ceptors are not attacked.
Each attacked interceptor counterattacks against the
attacking escort and does not engage an attack aircraft.
Interceptors which were not engaged by escorts engage
attack aircraft. Ground attack aircraft don't fight back.




All attack aircraft engaged by interceptors jettison
their ordnance and abort their mission in order to evade
the interceptors.
Given the probabilities (user specified)
X (Y ) GF
Pg \ ' = probability that an i-type ground attack sortie
of side X(Y) survives an attack by one k-type
ABD- or BFD-fighter sortie of the opponent,
X (Y ) FF
PSik
= ProbabilitY that an i-type ABD- or BFD-fighter
of side X(Y) survives a dogfight with a k-type
escort fighter of the opponent,
PSik
) ' EF
= Probability that an i-type EBA- or EIN-fighter
of side X(Y) survives a dogfight with a k-type
ABD- or BFD-fighter of the opponent,
where
G denounces a ground attack fighter on ABA (y = 2)
or INT (y = 4) mission,
E their escorts - EBA (y = 7) and EIN (y = 8) and
F their fighter opponents on ABD (y = 5)- and
BFD (y = 6) missions.











,„X(Y) ,GF,yX(Y) - X(Y) . X(Y) ^,
( Sik J ' for H < 1/Y > 1
. X(Y) ., „X(Y),GF, - X(Y) . X(Y) ^.


























»X(Y), n ~X(YK pX(Y) ,FE6 +(1-6 )P
sik
C Y(X)for n < 1
With n being the ratio of the number of fighters escorting
the ground attack aircraft versus the number of enemy fighters






number of air defense fighters
^XCY) not engaged by escorts
number of ground attack aircraft
r
X(Y)
number of air defense
fighters
number of fighters
1 escorting the ground f
.attack a/c
number of air defense fighters
= fraction of air defense fighters which attack
enemy ground attack aircraft.
The thus derived probabilities modify the probability P







pX(Y),u pX(Y) ,<,X(Y) ,1PSi,v " PSi,V FSi lb ' fc >
which determines the number of effective ABA- and INT sorties
X (Y) 2 X (Y) 4
S. and S. and the number of surviving air systems
X / V 1 f v
S,y S,y
xi,v' yi,v*
(3) Modifications to the Air-to-Air Combat
The following section briefly presents modifi-
cations to the original model.
In the original model all attack aircraft
engaged by interceptors jettison their ordnance and abort
their mission in order to evade the interceptors.
The modification enables the attack aircraft
to counterattack the interceptors after dropping their ordnance.
This situation will only occur when there are excess interceptors
not engaged with escort fighters. Given the probability
X ( Y) FC
PSik
= Probability tnat an i-type ABD- or BFD-
fighter of side X(Y) survives a dogfight
with a k-type ground attack a/c of the
opponent
the probabilities of survival in the DCA-encounters as calcu-
lated in section l.a. (2) have to be modified.
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The existing model doesn't take into consideration that
the ground attack a/c (bomber) could engage in a dogfight
with enemy fighters (interceptors)
.
An extension of the model might take a look at this
possibility in the following way:









G - (F -E)
Figure 7
>
a. If the # of Escort a/c > # F (ABD, BFD) [n ^ 1] - then
all bombers will go through.
b. If the # Escort < # F then part of the ABD or BFD
fighters, (F -E) attack the bomber. The bombers drop
their ordnance and engage in a dogfight with the
remaining fighters.
The maximum number of attacked bombers depends on the
difference (F -E) .
bl) If (F-E) > G all ground attack a/c are attacked and








b2) If (F -E) < G then some of the ground attack a/c
(F-E-G) will finish their mission with the basis
X ( Y) u
survivability P q . and the rest engage with the ABD











The modification however changes the survival probability of
the defense fighters due to the dogfight with ground attack
a/c in the following way:









Y(X),F - L '
i,v
there is no change because all defense fighters are
engaged with the escort fighters.
If n > 1, there are two cases:
b.1.1. There are more defense fighters, not engaged in a dogfight

















this amounts to that a fraction of the difference
F-E-G of defense fighters are in a dogfight with ground
attack a/c, and the fraction of defense fighters
neither engaged with escort fighters nor with ground
*y ( V ) F
attack a/c is idle and their P_ . ' =1.
' Si,v
b.1.2. The fraction of defense fighters not engaged with
escort fighters is outnumbered by ground attack a/c,
i.e., y < 1 or (F -E) < G, then all the remaining defense
fighters are in a dogfight with the ground attack a/c
X ( Y ) GF
and survive with probability P_. !'bl , JC
b. Air-To-Ground Attrition Due To Air Base Attack
The TAWAG model considers two types of air base
attacks the collateral damage of which may lead to a temporary
suppression and degredation of ground support activities.
The first mode is General Aba where the air systems
allocated to ABA are uniformly distributed over all enemy
i Asystems, l = l,...,n
x(Y) .
The second mode, Concentrated Aba allocates all
ABA-sorties to one enemy air system. In both cases, the sorties
may be directed to either of the enemy's air systems on the






































































In III.C.l two probabilities were defined
and used in subsequent sections but not evaluated yet. In
the chain of events in Figure 5 the events e, and e 5 relate
to the possibility that air systems are killed on the ground
or that the runway is damaged before they can take off for a
mission due to the enemy's attacking the air base.
X (Y)The probability P^ . that air system i












of type k attacking
i-type air systems
on the ground in
probability that
i-type air system




X (Y)The conditional probability P„h that an i-type system is
killed on the ground by an attacking k-type sortie, and the
X (Y)probability P c . that the attacked system i is on the ground
when the attack occurs are user specified inputs.
The average number of air systems of type k
attacking i-type air systems on the ground in [t f t„,, ) is
different in the two modes: General ABA and Concentrated ABA.
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< P . V .Bi y i,v
for i = 1
otherwise































X ( Y ) uThe probability PT . that an air system i
allocated to mission \i can take off is a function of the number
of k-type enemy sorties attacking per base or runway used by
i-type air systems and the runway repair capability of the air
base organization after an ABA attack.
The runway repair capability can be expressed
X (Y)in terms of a user specified rate T.
t
at which the probability
for take-off increases (back to 1) per time interval At (0.7
for i = i; 0.5 for i = 2,... ,5).
Similar to the SAS-payoff function the mono-
X (Y) Y (X)tonically decreasing function g. (H. . ) reflects the reduc-2 3 ifp ki
Y (X)tion in runway availability as the number H, . of k-type
enemy sorties attacking per base or runway increases.
X(Y . , -. ,










X(Y) (H?.(Y) ) = for H*.(Y) =ki




















with n. denoting the number of bases or runways used by
i-type air systems.
The probability for take off then results
in
X(Y) (HY(XK . TX(Y) ( X(Y) , HY(X) }gi,U ki,v )+kv i U " gi,y ( ki,v )} '
pX(Y) , ,_Y(X) ,2. <
*Ti,v** &k,v ;






where t * > t and t denotes the time at which the last ABA
occurred. Also k = l,...,(t *-t )/At expresses the number
of time intervals of length At elapsed since the last ABA-
attack at t .
v
The model also allows for considerations that
subsequent ABA missions take place at a time t * such that
(t * - t ) < x ,y > (i.e., runway has not yet been fully repaired),
i X ( Y) Y (X) 2by calculating the combined effects as P_. * (S, ) related
to the previous and the new ABA.
(3) Suppression Effects
Collateral damage from ABA-attacks, which might
temporarily reduce the sortie production capability of the
ground support organization is specified similar to the defense
X (Y) Y (X)
suppression by the ABA-suppression function h. (**]<. ) as
the probability that the ground support organization is at
Y (X)its full capacity after an attack on its base by H, . k-type
sorties of the opponent.
It results in a sortie generation rate
sXWl.li
. GXCY),P ,«*«>)i,v* 1 i,v* k,v
X ( Y) u
where G. ' is the i-type system's sortie generation rate
per time interval At = (t , -t ) (v = 1,...,N ) in an OCA-
free environment and the second expression is the reduction
factor at time t * > t which yields
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1 , v * k , v
= <
« <4S> +°x(Y) v«L<«<«»
Atfor (t
v# -tv ) < X(Y)
otherwise
X (Y)Q. being the regeneration rate of the i-type ground support
organization and k as defined before.
D. GROUND COMBAT - THE GROUND WAR MODEL
In the ground war model the firepower-score approach is
used to determine the FEBA-movement resulting from the inter-
actions between the opposing ground forces and from the effec-
tive offensive air support sorties of the opposing air forces.
The firepower-score approach is an index number method for
aggregating the heterogeneous forces of each side into a single
equivalent homogeneous force. The term firepower-score is
usually taken to mean the value or capability of an individual
weapon or weapon system where the term firepower index iden-
tifies the index number for a unit's capability as the summed
firepower scores (or military capability of some aggregation
of diverse weapons) . Mathematically
where
S . = firepower score of ith system of the X force
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x. = number of effective weapons in unit
I
x
= firepower index of the unit.









(3) command and control (C )
.
1. The Battlefield
The battlefield is divided into sectors. The number
of sectors and the width of each sector can be varied by the
user depending on the terrain, natural and artificial obstacles
(e.g., forests, rivers) etc. Each sector contains a combat
region and a rear region. Ground combat takes place only in
the combat region of the sector. The combat forces are separated
by the FEBA the initial position of which is given by the
demarcation line (see Figure 9) . To represent terrain, each
sector is divided into terrain-traf ficability segments (see
Figure 10) . Within each such segment, the terrain traffica^
bility is assumed to be homogeneous. There are three types
of terrain: normal, fortified zones, and minefields which
spread throughout the sectors starting at the demarcation







































































































The combat capability of the ground force which is
considered to consist of homogeneous units (divisions) is
quantified in terms of a firepower index. The initial (TO&E)




















x(y \ denotes the firepower score of the k-type subunit




, y . ) , and x, and y,
their initial numbers. As an example how the firepower indices
are computed, blue and red division are aggregated as follows
(Table VII) . The resulting firepower index for a Blue Tank
Division and a Red Motorized Division would come out as 61680
and 40940 respectively based on the above firepower scores.
But it should be mentioned that this is only an example and
the input for the firepower scores and the number of weapon
systems in the different divisions must be provided by the
user. The ground war model provides a different replacement
policy for each side.
CY
Y replaces its initially available n. units in total
when their combat capability drops below a certain level by
RY








weapon firepower firepower #/Div #/Div





1 Rifle 1 12 3600 2800
2 APC (MG) 6 18 180 100
3 ATW k 3 3 900 350
4 m 20 11 180 220
5 h 30 20 460 330
6 Tank 60 75 360 250
7 Art k 45 32 100 180
8 h 120 60 65 20
9 Heli-
copter
60 - 50 -
Weapon System Combat Capability
Table VII
each sector j , the number of Y combat units never exceeds
CY
n. and the combat capabilities of all units are always iden-
tical. The units in each sector j behave as one unit as far
as replacements are concerned.
X is assumed to commit reserves as soon as they
arrive in the rear area. Therefore, the units comprising the
X combat forces in each sector may not be identical with respect
to their fighting strength because of different lengths of
time in combat. Thus, X units need to be tracked individually




Combat is modeled by three processes:
- attrition
- movement
- command and control.
The attrition and movement processes are represented by a
system of three first-order, difference equations for x. ,
y . , and d . , where
x. denotes the combat capability of all X ground




y . denotes the firepower index of all Y ground
D / v
forces in the combat region of the j-th sector
at time t , and
v
d. denotes FEBA position in the j-th sector at time t .
2
The command and control (C ) process is represented by a logic
which simulates tactical decisions by the unit commanders
resulting in
(1) arrival of new units
(2) departure of old units
(3) tactical behavior of units.
Under tactical behavior the behavior of units at varying levels
of losses (unit breakpoints) is meant. Examples for the tactical
















fTZ: Breakpoint for an attacking unit (must stop attack
and defend)
fTTpt Breakpoint for a defneding unit (attacked unit
must withdraw)















Yf_ T : Unit replaced if replacement available at front
fZI: Breakpoint for an attacking unit (must stop attackW
and defend)





a. The Attrition Process
The model considers two types of possible losses:
ground-induced and air-induced. The ground-induced losses of
combat capability are developed from "ATLAS-like" casualty
curves (see Figure 13, and [Ref. 15]). The air-induced losses
result from the opponent's close air support activities in
the combat region. In the rear region enemy air attack (inter-
diction) is assumed to be the only source of attrition. Losses
in the rear region need therefore to be treated differently.
(1) Combat Region
For the X-force the combat capability
x ,, at time t , is equal to the combat capability at the
previous time t reduced by the losses suffered in the time
interval [t ,t ,) of length At, i.e.,
yG G r ground-induced •: r air-induced-,
v+1 v ^losses of X * ^losses of x'
The ground-induced losses are a function of (1) the attacker/
defender (A/D) force ratio (i.e., A/D - ratio of firepower
indices for all ground forces in the combat region of a sector,
and (2) the engagement type. They result in
ground-induced
_
«. , G . /A . G
losses of X - fX (rv' ev } (At) Xv
where
f (r ,e ) denotes X's fractional loss in combat
capability per day from enemy ground-
force activities (from ATLAS casualty





DIVISION CASUALTY RATES AS A FUNCTION
OF FORCE RATIO
60 r























r denotes the attacker/defender force ratio at
time t , xG/yG or yG/xG ,
e denotes the engagement type at t , and
At denotes the length of the assessment period.
The engagement type is determined by the mission of the
opposing commanders in a sector (Table VIII) . HENCE
e
v - W V
It should be mentioned that the method for computing force
ratios is rather simple and does not reflect real actions.
Since no attrition occurs to airpower in the ground model,
that contribution to value should not appear in the force
ratio for the purpose of having it "attrited. " The force
ratio is computed in ATLAS and TAWAG as follows:
Red's Total Ground Value in Sector
Force Ratio + Red's Total CAS Value in Sector
A/D Blue's Total Ground Value in Sector
+ Blue's Total CAS Value in Sector
The air-induced losses of X*s combat capability which result
from the opponent's Y close air support (CAS) activities in




air-induced 1 v Y _Y,3
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and reflect one part of the air activities* contribution in
support of the ground battle.
The air-induced losses are a function of the
Y 3
number of effective CAS sorties, S.' generated by the i-th
l , v
Y
Y air-system during a time step, the value a. of X's, destroyed
ground-force targets by one effective Y CAS sortie and the
number of sectors J into which the entire battlefield has been
divided, under the assumption that all Y CAS sorties are uni-
Yformly distributed over the sectors. The number a. and J
Y 3
are user inputs whereas S.' depends on the air war strategies
chosen by the opponents.
Then, the ground-combat-capability at a time





G , G /AJ_, 1 v YY,3X
v+1 = Xv " fX (rv' e v )xv (At) " J J x a i Si,v
for Y accordingly. Since the combat takes place in the sectors
only, the above equation becomes
G G - , G xG /A4 , 1 VY Y C)Y,
:. ,, = x. - fv (r. ,e. )x. (At) - -= > a. S.3,v+l D,v X' ] f v' ],v' ],v v J itll l l,
with initial condition for X.
G CX
x . n = cv n . , for Y accordingly,
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Due to the different replacement policies the losses of the
X and Y forces need to be counted differently. Since all the
Y ground-combat forces in the combat region of the battlefield
sector are treated as one unit, no distribution of the overall
Y losses to the component Y divisions is necessary, whereas
for the X force, under the assumption that all losses are
distributed uniformly to the x divisions within the combat





- "x'"^1^ for a11 * £ 4s
V
where Ir.'v denotes the indices of the X units that are effectiveAd
in the combat region of a sector at time t .
v
The ground war model also offers a special
option for the computation of losses. It reflects the tacti-
cal considerations of some new possible NATO defense strate-
gies. Instead of evaluating the exchange ratio with the fire-
power indices, the overall exchange ratio is computed from
curves depicting its dependence on the length of the engagement
TE <_ At, which is "broken off" by the defender. It reflects
the idea, that with increasing time the attackers of fortified
positions become more and more aware of the defenders ' posi-
tions and therefore their fire becomes increasingly more





casualties fY Crj,v ejr v) y°,v te
using ATLAS casualty rate curves
(2) ,X's ground-induced,
casualties
,Y's ground-induced. .Overall ex- .
casualties change ratio







LENGTH OF ENGAGEMENT T E
Dependence of the Overall Exchange
Ratio on the Length of Engagement
Figure 14
(2) Rear Region
The attrition process in the rear region
differs from that in the combat zone insofar that only air-
induced losses from enemy INT-mission account for losses to
ground force units, and only when they are assembled in staging
areas or when they are in transit from their staging areas
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to the front. Vulnerability in both cases is assumed to be
X (Y)the same and is defined by the value 6 • of ground force
units destroyed by one X(Y) INT-sortie.
TAWAG leaves the user two options. Inter-
diction being distributed equally among all sectors (general
INT) , or concentrated in one sector (concentrated INT)
.




X X „X,4GSA GSA 1 v




XGSA GSA v „X „X,4y. , , = y. - ) B • S.DC,v+l jc,v
.fi, 1 i,v
respectively. The equation for the X ground forces are similar




due to the different replacement policy,
b. The Movement Process
(1) Combat Region
The attackers rate of advance in each sector
is determined as a function of defender posture, terrain,
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and the prevailing force ratio of attacker effectiveness to
defender effectiveness.
The ground war model determines FEBA movement
by the FEBA-movement equation as follows:
d J_, = d + F(p ;t ) (At)v+1 v v v
where the expression F(p ;t ) (At) is the change in FEBA
position in the sector at time t . Several factors not usually
accounted for are included in the above equation;
F(p ;t ) denotes the opposed movement rate (see



















1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
FORCE RATIO (ATTACKER DEFENDER)
Opposed Movement Rate as a Function




The curves are derived from Rex Goad [Ref . 33] . p denotes
v
the attacker/defender force ratio (including the disruptive
effects of CAS), and t = (e ,Q ) is a vector and denotes the
tactical situation at time t with e being the engagement
type at time t , and Q the terrain traf ficability at time
t . The FEBA-movement in a given sector is computed accordingly
To account for disruptive, even noncasualty
producing effects of a CAS sortie the A/D force ratio is
computed differently compared to the method used so far by





+ k i 4 sx ' 3
i=l '
n.





The movement rate of reserve forces which
move from the staging area to the front is simulated by
X(Y)
=










— times the above for general INT
The value for the parameters for the reduction of unopposed
movement rates of reserves from INT must be specified by the
user. The authors suggest values of 20 kilometers/hour for
both v and v and 1.0 for w. .
o o 1
Y 4 X 4The functions gx (S .) and gy (S ' ) are
montonically decreasing functions that reduce X's and Y r s




(500 - SY ' 4 )/500 for < SY/4 < 500
Y 4for 500 < S '
— v
X 4
and for g.. (S ' ) similarly.3Y v
2
c. Command and Control (C ) Process
(1) Combat Region
To simulate the tactical decisions of the
section commanders the ground-war model takes into account
the ground-combat capability of the ground forces in the given
sector, the A/D force ratio of the opposing forces in that
sector, the FEBA-position in the sector, all at time t and










and according to Figures 11 and 12.
It should be noted that for the Y force in
a sector the mission My' = stop and defend is considered if
the combat capability y. is less or equal to the fraction of
j I v
AY G DV f
fBP yj,0 but 9reater than fBD Y j,0' similarly
M^.' = withdraw
will be executed ifthe combat capability of a defending unit
in a sector falls below the fraction of the original strength
determined by the breakpoint for a defending unit.
For the X forces the calculations are similar,
but the missions of the divisions, Mv , in a sector mustA
sometimes be considered separately, since different X divisions
may be in the combat region for different lengths of time, thus
Ml'j'^ = M^' V (4'\rG ,d. ,t )A X X ' j,V j # V f V
Similar to the before mentioned decision factors, the mission
stop and defend or withdraw of the units are evaluated corres-
ponding to the fractional strength of the unit. The following
100





















for fj£ < 4' v £ 1.0




for < 4- < f£
where
J/V
_ j j y v
Y G
yj,o
The engagement type e. is determined from Table VIII given
the pair of missions (K^'-*' ,M^' ).
The model has a built-in termination rule
which becomes effective if Mv '
3/V
= WITHDRAW for all
i i v .





The C process in the rear region deals with
the transfer of units from the rear region to the combat region
requiring that
(a) a unit must first remain in the staging area for a
given time to assemble T_,
(b) a unit must then move a given distance from the staging
area to the front line D_.
During assembling and marching to the front line, a unit is
exposed to enemy INT which causes delay.
Other assumptions inherent in the model are:
(a) replacement units are scheduled to arrive as functions
of time only,
(b) when X reserve divisions arrive at the rear region, they
are immediately dispatched to the front,
(c) as many divisions as possible are dispatched to the
C Y G
front whenever y. f™iTT ¥-; n ( see Fi9ure 12),
(d) units disperse and new units are called into the
staging area if Y units in the rear region are
Y




TAWAG was developed to investigate questions relating to
force structure planning, e.g., offensive versus defensive
systems, direct or indirect offensive air support systems,
multi-purpose versus special purpose systems. By providing
the reader with an a priori evaluation of the model, the goal
was to provide the reader with some feeling as how state-of-
the-art TAWAG is. The ultimate evaluation would be to compare
the predictions given by the model with real combat data. How-
ever this is currently not feasible for any combat model. The
next step would be to exercise the model to gain insights into
the complex random process of air/ground combat, in particular
as to a/c allocations influence ground combat, and insights
into the balance between achieving air superiority on the one
hand, and providing close air support on the other, and the
transition between emphasis on one and then the other component
in an optimal strategy. Although this would be highly desirable,
it was beyond the scope of this thesis to do that. Such work
is highly recommended for the future.
The optimization methodology used in TAWAG is a heuristic
one and can be labeled as an approximate optimization. The
advantage of so-called approximate game solvers like TAC CONTENDER
and DYGAM are that they can treat much bigger staged games in
reasonable running times than rigorous game solvers like OPTSA.
Where the former treat up to 90 stages, the latter permits only
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3. The term strategy used in the context may be misleading
as the model does not determine an optimal strategy for allo-
cating a/c to missions but determines the sequence of deci-
sions a concerning the allocation of the air resources to
missions.
TAWAG's biggest advantage over the other 4 described
optimizing models is that not only multiple aircraft types can
be played but that it makes also a wider selection of missions
available than any other model. Further it is the only model
besides TAC CONTENDER that distinguishes battlefield defense
from air base defense. These two factors make it possible to
investigate not only long-range planning concerning operational
design of future aircraft but also to investigate trade-offs
between air and ground systems. The analyst however should be
aware of, as Stockfish [Ref. 19] points out, that model outputs
must never be taken as predictive of the actual outcome of
combat but as a means of establishing trends, relative com-
parisons, and insights into the dynamic combat. Even when
using the most sophisticated and detailed model, the final
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